

Message Text

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ACTION EA-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0798

INFO USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USLO PEKING

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 16786

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: VN KN KS FR PFOR

SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS CONCERNING KOREA

SUMMARY: QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA DUZER GAVE EMBOFF
JUNE 26 GOF IMPRESSIONS OF NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS. KIM
IL SUNG'S INITIAL VIEW THAT THE MOMENTUM OF THE COMMUNIST
VICTORIES IN INDOCHINA COULD LEAD TO RAPID KOREAN UNIFI-
CATION HAD BEEN MODIFIED DURING HIS VISIT TO THE PRC.
KIM NOW BELIEVES UNIFICATION WILL BE IN A MORE DISTANT
FUTURE AND BY MEANS WHICH ARE NOT YET CLEAR. DPRK POLI-
TICAL/DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WILL HAVE THE VICTORY OF
ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN UNGA AS SHORT TERM GOAL AND
BROADENING OF SUPPORT FOR DPRK AS LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE.
DUZER THOUGHT DPRK HAD GOOD CHANCES ON BOTH SCORES, AND
PROSPECTS FOR ROK WERE DISCOURAGING. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING PERIODIC TOUR D'HORIZON OF EAST ASIAN PROB-
LEMS, QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA DUZER DISCUSSED
FRENCH VIEWS OF THE KOREAN SITUATION AND THE COMING
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PROBLEM IN THE UNGA. DUZER SAID KIM IL SUNG HAD OBVI-

OUSLY BEEN GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY EVENTS IN INDOCHINA, NOT ONLY BY THE DRV VICTORY BUT THE US ACQUIESCENCE. AS MANY HAD REMARKED, KIM'S SPEECH ON ARRIVING IN PEKING INDICATED HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY TO FURTHER UNIFICATION--"WE WOULD NOT STAND WITH FOLDED ARMS IF THERE WERE A POPULAR UPRISING IN THE SOUTH." DUZER THOUGHT KIM HAD RECEIVED HIS FIRST STRONG LESSON IN REALISM IMMEDIATELY FROM THE PRC, AS SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM CHINA SHOWED. PRC PROBABLY ARGUED THAT KIM SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE THE PARALLEL WITH INDOCHINA; THERE WERE VERY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES. DUZER CITED THE MORE COHESIVE ROK AND ITS ARMY, AND ALSO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPAN'S PROXIMITY. FROM KIM'S LATER REMARKS IN OTHER CAPITALS DURING HIS TRIP, DUZER CONCLUDED THAT KIM HAD CONSIDERABLY MODIFIED HIS POSITION. HE NO LONGER CONSIDERED THAT HE COULD USE THE MOMENTUM FROM THE COMMUNIST INDOCHINA VICTORIES TO PUSH FOR RAPID KOREAN UNIFICATION. KIM STILL BELIEVES HE WILL UNIFY KOREA, BUT NOW THINKS THAT IT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SOME MEANS AS YET UNCLEAR (IN ANY CASE, NOT THE DRV WAY) AND AT AN INDEFINITE DATE IN THE FUTURE.

2. TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS MORE COMPLEX AND INDEFINITE REUNIFICATION, KIM WOULD MOUNT A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. THE SHORT TERM GOAL OF THIS PROGRAM IS A VICTORY IN THE UNGA FOR THE PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION; THE LONGER TERM GOAL IS BROADENING DPRK DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ENHANCING THE DPRK CONTACTS WITH ALL THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AND CONSOLIDATING THEIR SUPPORT FOR EVENTUAL UNIFICATION ON PYONG YANG'S TERMS.

3. ACCORDING TO DUZER, KIM IS AWARE THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION (WHICH THE GOF THINKS IS CERTAIN) WILL NOT CHANGE THE FACTS. THE UN COMMAND WILL NOT BE DISSOLVED, AND THE US TROOPS WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN. THE VOTE WILL, HOWEVER, BE A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR THE DPRK. KIM WOULD USE THE VICTORY TO EMBARRASS THE US AND THE ROK, AND HE MIGHT HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME EFFECT ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA. KIM MIGHT EVEN THINK THAT THE UNGA VOTE WOULD EVENTUALLY REDUCE

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THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US LEGISLATURE TO VOTE FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE ROK.

4. KIM WOULD SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN ANY COMPROMISE SOLUTION IN THE UN ON KOREA, NOT EVEN ONE WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE UNC WITH SOME MECHANISM TO REPLACE ITS FUNCTION. KIM WOULD CERTAINLY FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT ANY REPLACEMENT MEASURE WHICH IN EFFECT

SUBSTITUTED A JOINT ROK AND US COMMAND DELEGATION ON THE NON-COMMUNIST SIDE TO REPLACE THE UNC IN DEALINGS WITH THE DPRK AND PRC REPRESENTATIVES. SUCH A CHANGE WOULD LEGITIMIZE THE US PRESENCE, EXACTLY WHAT THE DPRK OPPOSES.

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5. DUZER THOUGHT THERE WAS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT THE USSR OR PRC WOULD GO ALONG WITH ANY DEAL FOR SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A COMPROMISE UN SOLUTION ON KOREA IN RETURN FOR US SUPPORT FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE TWO VIETNAMS. THE USSR WOULD BE SATISFIED IF IT COULD SHOW HANOI IT HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED HANOI'S POSITION AND THAT IT WAS THE US WHICH HAD VETOED. ON THE OTHER HAND, ACCEPTANCE OF A COMPROMISE ON KOREA WOULD BE VERY BADLY RECEIVED IN PYONG YANG. DUZER THOUGHT THAT KIM MIGHT EVEN WELCOME A US VETO OF THE VIETNAMS' MEMBERSHIP SINCE IT WOULD BE

ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF US DEFIANCE OF "NON-ALIGNED"
OPINION.

6. DUZER SAID GOF HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COME UP WITH A
SCENARIO WHICH GAVE MUCH LIKELIHOOD OF HELPING THE ROK.
THE REAFFIRMATION THIS YEAR OF LAST YEAR'S RESO-
LUTION IS IMPOSSIBLE. DUZER NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT
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HE HAD OPPOSED THE REFERENCE IN LAST YEAR'S FRIENDLY
RESOLUTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SINCE IT ANTAGONIZED
THE PRC ON THE BASIS OF FORM. ONE IDEA WAS A NEW RESO-
LUTION PROPOSING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC AND ITS RE-
PLACEMENT BY THE ROK ONLY, WITH THE DPRK TACITLY BECOM-
ING THE ONLY PARTICIPANT ON THE COMMUNIST SIDE. EVEN
SUCH A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT, DUZER THOUGHT,
PASS THE UNGA SINCE THE DPRK WAS NOW ASSURED OF A VICTORY
FOR ITS RESOLUTION. AS FOR THE LONGER TERM, DUZER
THOUGHT THAT DPRK COULD WITH SOME JUSTICE EXPECT TO MAKE
PROGRESSIVE GAINS FROM ITS POLITICAL OFFENSIVE. ANY
ROK EFFORTS TO MAKE CONTACT WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
WOULD BE BLOCKED, AND THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WOULD
INCREASINGLY SUPPORT THE DPRK. DESPITE A LACK OF PROG-
RESS IN FORCING THE REMOVAL OF US FORCES, PYONG YANG
WOULD ASSURE THAT ITS STRENGTH CONTINUED TO GROW AT THE
EXPENSE OF SEOUL. IN SUM, DUZER THOUGHT THE ROK PROS-
PECTS WERE VERY DISCOURAGING.
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